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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

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OKERLUND, ZACHARY SCIACCA, )  
SUSAN SPENCER, JENNIFER STEARNS, )  
TREVOR NIXON, MARK THOMPSON, and )  
BRYAN VENAAS )

Case No.

COMPLAINT FOR:

1. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
2. NEGLIGENCE
3. VIOLATIONS PER PUC § 2106
4. PREMISES LIABILITY
5. TRESPASS
6. PUBLIC NUISANCE
7. PRIVATE NUISANCE
8. VIOLATION OF HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13007

Plaintiff(s),

BY FAX

COMPLAINT

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vs.  
PG&E CORPORATION, a California  
Corporation, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC  
COMPANY, a California Corporation and  
DOES 1-50, inclusive,  
Defendant(s).

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
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**I. THE CAMP FIRE – DEADLIEST IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY**

1. Plaintiffs bring this action for damages against Defendants PG&E CORPORATION, a California Corporation, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, a California Corporation (collectively, “PG&E” or the “PG&E Defendants”) and DOES 1-50, inclusive, for damages they suffered arising out of a fire ignited on the early morning of November 8, 2018, at Camp Creek Road near the town of Pulga, Butte County (the “Camp Fire”).

2. The Camp Fire torched the towns of Concow, Paradise, Magalia, Pulga, Mineral Slide, Irish Town, Centerville, and Parkhill, and terrorized several neighboring towns including Oroville, Gridley and Chico. To date, the Camp Fire killed 85 people and injured 3 firefighters, making it the deadliest fire in California history. The Camp Fire tore through and burned over 153,000 acres, destroyed almost 14,000 residences, over 500 commercial buildings, and over 4,200 other structures. Over 150,000 residents have been displaced from their homes as a result of the Camp Fire and over 1,300 people are currently unaccounted for. Particularly hard hit was the town of Paradise where 80 to 90 percent of the homes were destroyed.

3. The map below shows the progression of the Camp Fire as of November 18, 2018:



1           5.       At 6:15 a.m. on November 8, 2018, a high-voltage line on PG&E's Caribou-Palermo  
2 115 kV transmission circuit six miles away from the Poe Dam generating station malfunctioned and  
3 ignited the Camp Fire.<sup>1</sup> The first report of fire came at 6:29 a.m., and within fifteen minutes, the fire  
4 had spread to 10 acres. Before Cal Fire crews could reach the scene and before Cal Fire planes and  
5 helicopters could get airborne, the Camp Fire erupted into a vicious inferno that rapidly swept uphill  
6 and engulfed the town of Concow and swept downhill, into, and through Paradise. By 7:10 a.m., the  
7 town of Concow was abaze. The first orders to evacuate Paradise came at 7:46 a.m.

8           6.       By nightfall, the Camp Fire spread more than 19 miles over an entire mountain,  
9 surprising, trapping, terrifying, and killing, quickly making it the deadliest and most destructive in  
10 California history.<sup>2</sup> Evacuation plans utterly failed, fire spread faster than warnings could be given,  
11 escape routes became gridlocks and then fire traps. Hundreds were forced to flee from the consuming  
12 flames on foot. The following photo shows a small part of the devastation of Paradise on the morning  
13 of November 9, 2018.



26  
27 <sup>1</sup>[http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc\\_downloads/2018/wildfire/11/Electric-Safety-Incident-Reported-Pacific-Gas-Electric-Incident-No-181108-9002.pdf](http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_downloads/2018/wildfire/11/Electric-Safety-Incident-Reported-Pacific-Gas-Electric-Incident-No-181108-9002.pdf)

28 <sup>2</sup>[https://www.gazettextra.com/news/nation\\_world/what-started-as-a-tiny-brush-fire-became-california-s/article\\_9b32290d-1cb4-554b-a984-ef7ae358b189.html](https://www.gazettextra.com/news/nation_world/what-started-as-a-tiny-brush-fire-became-california-s/article_9b32290d-1cb4-554b-a984-ef7ae358b189.html)



1           7.       In 2012, five consecutive lattice-steel towers on the Caribou-Palermo transmission  
2 circuit near the point of origin of the Camp Fire collapsed after a winter storm. They were removed  
3 and temporarily replaced with wooden poles in 2013, but the steel towers were not replaced until  
4 2016.<sup>3</sup> The following photograph shows the extremely rugged terrain of the Caribou-Palermo circuit  
5 taken from the origin site of the Camp Fire looking to the northeast.



28 <sup>3</sup>[https://www.pge.com/notes/rates/tariffs/tm2/pdf/ELEC\\_4256-E.pdf](https://www.pge.com/notes/rates/tariffs/tm2/pdf/ELEC_4256-E.pdf)

1           8.       The following photograph shows the extremely rugged terrain of the Caribou-Palermo  
2 circuit taken from the origin site of the Camp Fire looking to the southwest.




24           9.       In the afternoon of November 8, 2018, PG&E's aerial patrol observed damage to a steel  
25 transmission tower on the Caribou-Palermo 115 kV transmission circuit at what turned out to be the  
26 origin site of the Camp Fire.<sup>4</sup>


27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>4</sup>[http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc\\_downloads/2018/wildfire/11/Electric-Safety-Incident-Reported-Pacific-Gas-Electric-Incident-No-181108-9002.pdf](http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_downloads/2018/wildfire/11/Electric-Safety-Incident-Reported-Pacific-Gas-Electric-Incident-No-181108-9002.pdf)




1           10.     The following photograph shows a “transpositional” tower of a type similar to the  
2 damaged tower observed by PG&E’s aerial patrol. In transpositional towers, the positioning of the  
3 circuit wires is switched from one side of the tower to the other. The purpose of transposing the wires  
4 is to reduce power loss across long spans of cable. Note the extension on the lower left side of the  
5 tower that holds a “jumper” cable away from the tower and leads wire indicated by the red diamond  
6 from one side of the tower to the other, transposing the position of the wire.



1           11.     The following photo shows the damaged tower at the origin site as it was being  
2 inspected for the first time by engineers after Cal Fire released the crime scene to representatives of  
3 affected parties on November 18, 2018, when pieces of insulators and other debris still littered the  
4 ground under the tower. The red arrows point to ends of wires after Cal Fire removed the sections that  
5 failed and took them into custody. The orange arrows point to where the jumper extension was  
6 attached to the tower before Cal Fire removed it and took it into custody when inspecting the crime  
7 scene.



1           12.     According to reports, the Camp Fire started when the mechanism attaching one of the  
2 insulators on the jumper extension failed allowing the uninsulated jumper to dangle free and contact  
3 tower.<sup>5</sup> The following enlargement from the photograph of the similar, undamaged tower shows  
4 where the attachment of the insulator to the jumper extension reportedly failed.



5 <https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Hook-on-PGE-Tower-Eyed-as-Cause-of-Deadly-Camp-Fire-502035081.html>



1           13.     PG&E's failure to properly inspect and maintain the tower led to damage to the tower's  
2 jumper extension which in turn brought the uninsulated jumper into contact with the steel tower.  
3 Blazing hot molten materials dropped into the fine dead fuels below the conductor igniting the  
4 devastating Camp Fire. Strong winds, low humidity, and dry vegetation fueled the fire. The intensity  
5 of the heat generated by the fire and the terrifying speed at which it spread are unimaginable. During  
6 the afternoon of November 8, the Camp Fire grew 10,000 acres in 90 minutes, or one football field  
7 every second.<sup>6</sup> The following photograph of a tree standing just 100 yards from the origin site of the  
8 Camp Fire illustrates the intensity of the heat generated by the fire just seconds after it started.



28 <sup>6</sup> <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/09/us/california-wildfires-superlatives-wcx/index.html>


1  
2 14. At approximately 6:45 a.m. on November 8, 2018, a second outage occurred on PG&E  
3 Big Bend 1101 12 kV distribution circuit on Concow Road between Mountain Pine Lane and Rim  
4 Road.<sup>7</sup> This outage was caused by the failure of a distribution line, and that failure ignited another  
5 blaze that was soon engulfed by and helped fuel the Camp Fire. The following photo shows the  
6 Concow origin site after Cal Fire had removed the distribution pole (marked by the red cone) near  
7 where the ignition occurred.




22 15. By 7:10 a.m., the Camp Fire reached Concow. The first evacuation order came for the  
23 town of Pulga at 7:23 a.m. The fire burned through the town of Magalia and reached Paradise at 8:50  
24 a.m. Within eight hours, the Camp Fire covered 28 square miles, or half the size of San Francisco.  
25 Within 48 hours, the Camp Fire eclipsed the 2017 Tubbs Fire as the most destructive wildfire in  
26 California History. The following map shows the two ignition sites and the affected towns.

27  
28 <sup>7</sup>[http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News\\_Room/NewsUpdates/2018/EI  
R\\_IncidentNo181116-9015.pdf](http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2018/EI_R_IncidentNo181116-9015.pdf)





16. The following satellite photograph of the Camp Fire was taken on November 8, 2018, at 10:45 a.m. and shows the awesome scope of the devastation even as it began.<sup>8</sup>



<sup>8</sup> <https://www.livescience.com/64108-camp-fire-engulfs-paradise-astonishing-satellite-images.html>

1           17.     Thousands of residents were displaced by the Camp Fire, forced to flee as the fire grew  
2 and spread rapidly. Some of the deaths resulting from the Camp Fire were of individuals fleeing in  
3 their cars who in the process of their harrowing escapes were overtaken by the speed of the flames that  
4 ultimately consumed them, leaving their charred corpses behind. These individuals cannot yet be  
5 identified due to the conditions of their scorched remains.

6           18.     Other residents who did manage to escape the flames alive did so at a moment's notice  
7 without any of their belongings, and some did so while desperately clutching to their young children  
8 as their surrounding town became engulfed in raging flames. Some of those who escaped in their cars  
9 through fire on both sides of the road endured a massive traffic jam that turned a 20 minute drive into  
10 one that took 4 to 6 hours.

11          19.     The Camp Fire was fully contained on November 25, 2018. Preliminary official  
12 statistics tell a gruesome story:

- 13           • 8 Fatalities
- 14           • 3 Firefighters Injured
- 15           • 153,336 Acres Burned
- 16           • 13,968 Single Family Residences Destroyed
- 17           • 462 Single Family Residences Damages
- 18           • 276 Multiple Family Residences Destroyed
- 19           • 528 Commercial Buildings Destroyed
- 20           • 102 Commercial Buildings Damaged
- 21           • 4,293 Other Structures Destroyed<sup>9</sup>

22          20.     Plaintiffs are among those harmed in their person and their property by the Camp Fire.  
23 Each Plaintiff individually seeks just compensation and damages as more particularly described below.

24          21.     Since the San Bruno gas pipeline explosion in 2010, disaster after disaster has followed  
25 in PG&E's wake. Tragically, the Camp Fire is the biggest and deadliest. This must stop.

26  
27  
28 <sup>9</sup> [http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/admin8327985/cdf/images/incidentfile2277\\_4326.pdf](http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/admin8327985/cdf/images/incidentfile2277_4326.pdf)

1 **II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

2 22. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§  
3 395(a) and 410.10 because both PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Company were  
4 incorporated in California, have their headquarters in San Francisco, California, engage in the bulk of  
5 their corporate activities in California, and maintain the bulk of their corporate assets in California.

6 23. Venue is proper in San Francisco County pursuant to California Code of Civil  
7 Procedure § 395.5 because both PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Company perform  
8 business in San Francisco County, have a principal place of business in San Francisco County, and a  
9 substantial part of the events, acts, omissions, and transactions complained occurred in San Francisco  
10 County.

11 24. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

12 **III. THE PARTIES**

13 **A. PLAINTIFFS**

14 25. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Albert Ahad was an owner and/or occupant of  
15 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

16 26. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Sylvia Kay and Michael Benedict were owners  
17 and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

18 27. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Netta Berkenstock and Erik Berkenstock were  
19 owners and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

20 28. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Patricia Bright and Jerry Bright were owners  
21 and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

22 29. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Monica Brinkman and Richard Brinkman were  
23 owners and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

24 30. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Raeanna Butts-King and Daryl Butts were  
25 owners and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

26 31. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Dinah Coffman was an owner and/or occupant of  
27 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire. Dolyn Le master is the  
28

1 minor child of Dinah Coffman for whom a *guardian ad litem* will be appointed and the name/s of  
2 those guardian/s will be added to a complaint at the first opportunity.

3 32. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Marilyn Darlington was an owner and/or  
4 occupant of real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

5 33. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Michael Faires and Lorraine Faires were owners  
6 and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

7 34. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Caitlin Fobert was an owner and/or occupant of  
8 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

9 35. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Karl Frenzel was an owner and/or occupant of  
10 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

11 36. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Lynne Grauberger was an owner and/or occupant  
12 of real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

13 37. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Nancy Hubbard was an owner and/or occupant of  
14 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

15 38. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Raymond Imbro was an owner and/or occupant  
16 of real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

17 39. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Gary Kendall was an owner and/or occupant of  
18 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

19 40. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Gerald Kuhn was an owner and/or occupant of  
20 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

21 41. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Dylan Loebel-Begelman and Catrina Oberg were  
22 owners and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

23 42. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Dale Miller was an owner and/or occupant of real  
24 property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

25 43. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Michael Moody was an owner and/or occupant of  
26 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

27 44. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Tom Okerlund and Cathy Okerlund were owners  
28 and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

1           45.     At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Zachary Sciacca was an owner and/or occupant  
2 of real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

3           46.     At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Susan Spencer was an owner and/or occupant of  
4 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

5           47.     At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs Jennifer Stearns and Trevor Nixon were owners  
6 and/or occupants of real property and owners of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

7           48.     At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Mark Thompson was an owner and/or occupant  
8 of real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

9           49.     At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff Bryan Venaas was an owner and/or occupant of  
10 real property and owner of personal property damaged by the Camp Fire.

11           **B.     DEFENDANTS**

12           50.     Defendant PG&E Corporation is an energy-based holding company headquartered in  
13 San Francisco, California. It is the parent company of Defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Company.

14           51.     Defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Company is incorporated in California and is  
15 headquartered in San Francisco, California. Defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Company provides  
16 public utility services that include the transmission and distribution of natural gas, and the generation,  
17 transmission, and distribution of electricity to millions of customers in Northern and Central  
18 California, including the residents of Butte County.

19           52.     The PG&E Defendants are jointly and severally liable for each other's negligence,  
20 misconduct, and wrongdoing as alleged herein, in that:

21           a.     The PG&E Defendants operate as a single business enterprise operating out of the same  
22 building located at 77 Beale Street, San Francisco, California, for the purpose of  
23 effectuating and carrying out PG&E Corporation's business and operations and/or for  
24 the benefit of PG&E Corporation;

25           b.     The PG&E Defendants do not operate as completely separate entities, but rather,  
26 integrate their resources to achieve a common business purpose;



- 1 c. Pacific Gas & Electric Company is so organized and controlled, and its decisions,  
2 affairs, and business are so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality, agent,  
3 conduit, or adjunct of PG&E Corporation;
- 4 d. Pacific Gas & Electric Company's income results from function integration,  
5 centralization of management, and economies of scale with PG&E Corporation;
- 6 e. The PG&E Defendants' officers and management are intertwined and do not act  
7 completely independently of one another;
- 8 f. The PG&E Defendants' officers and managers act in the interest of PG&E Corporation  
9 as a single enterprise;
- 10 g. PG&E Corporation has control and authority to choose and appoint Pacific Gas &  
11 Electric Company's board members as well as its other top officers and managers;
- 12 h. The PG&E Defendants do not compete with one another, but have been structured and  
13 organized and their business effectuated so as to create a synergistic, integrated single  
14 enterprise where various components operate in concert one with another;
- 15 i. PG&E Corporation maintains unified administrative control over Pacific Gas &  
16 Electric Company;
- 17 j. The PG&E Defendants are insured by the same carriers and provide uniform or similar  
18 pension, health, life, and disability insurance plans for employees;
- 19 k. The PG&E Defendants have unified 401(k) Plans, pension and investment plans, bonus  
20 programs, vacation policies, and paid time off from work schedules and policies;
- 21 l. The PG&E Defendants invest funds from their programs and plans by a consolidated  
22 and/or coordinated Benefits Committee controlled by PG&E Corporation and  
23 administered by common trustees and administrators;
- 24 m. The PG&E Defendants have unified personnel policies and practices and/or a  
25 consolidated personnel organization or structure;
- 26 n. The PG&E Defendants have unified accounting policies and practices dictated by  
27 PG&E Corporation and/or common or integrated accounting organizations or  
28 personnel;

- 1           o.     The PG&E Defendants are represented by common legal counsel;
- 2           p.     PG&E Corporation's officers, directors, and other management make policies and
- 3                 decisions to be effectuated by Pacific Gas & Electric Company and/or otherwise play
- 4                 roles in providing directions and making decisions for Pacific Gas & Electric
- 5                 Company;
- 6           q.     PG&E Corporation's officers, directors, and other management direct certain financial
- 7                 decisions for Pacific Gas & Electric Company including the amount and nature of
- 8                 capital outlays;
- 9           r.     PG&E Corporation's written guidelines, policies, and procedures control Pacific Gas
- 10                & Electric Company's employees, policies, and practices;
- 11           s.     PG&E Corporation files consolidated earnings statements factoring in all revenue and
- 12                 losses from Pacific Gas & Electric Company, as well as consolidated tax returns,
- 13                 including those seeking tax relief; and/or, without limitation;
- 14           t.     PG&E Corporation generally directs and controls Pacific Gas & Electric Company's
- 15                 relationship with, requests to, and responses to inquiries from, the CPUC and uses such
- 16                 direction and control for the benefit of PG&E Corporation.

17           53.    At all relevant times, each of the Defendants were the partners, principals, agents,

18 employees, servants, and joint venturers of each other, and in doing the things alleged in this

19 Complaint were acting within the course and scope of their authority and relationship as partners,

20 principals, agents, employees, servants and joint venturers with the permission, knowledge, and

21 consent of each other.

22           54.    The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of

23 Does 1 through 50, are unknown to Plaintiffs who, under Code of Civil Procedure § 474, sue these

24 Doe Defendants under fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to show their true names

25 and capacities when they are ascertained. Each of the Doe Defendants is in some manner legally

26 responsible for the occurrences alleged in this Complaint, and Plaintiffs' damages alleged in this

27 Complaint were legally caused by each of those Doe Defendants.

28

1 **IV. THE FACTS**

2 **A. PG&E IS REQUIRED TO SAFELY DESIGN, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN**  
3 **ITS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS**

4 55. PG&E owns, installs, constructs, operates, and maintains overhead power lines,  
5 together with supporting towers and appurtenances throughout Northern and Central California for the  
6 purpose of transmitting and distributing electricity the general public. Those transmission lines existed  
7 near the origin points of the Camp Fire.

8 56. Electrical infrastructure is inherently dangerous and hazardous, and PG&E recognizes  
9 it as such. The transmission and distribution of electricity requires PG&E exercise an increased level  
10 of care in line with the increased risk of associated danger.

11 57. At all times PG&E had and continues to have a duty to properly construct, inspect,  
12 repair, maintain, manage, and operate its transmission lines and other electrical equipment.

13 58. In the construction, inspection, repair, maintenance, management, ownership, and/or  
14 operation of its power lines and other electrical equipment, PG&E had an obligation to comply with,  
15 *inter alia*: (a) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (b) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435;  
16 (c) Public Utilities Code § 451; and (d) General Order Nos. 95 and 165.

17 59. In January 2014, Governor Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency due to  
18 California's continued drought. In June 2014, the CPUC directed PG&E and all investor owned  
19 utilities pursuant to Resolution ESRB-4 to take remedial measures to reduce the likelihood of fires  
20 started by or threatening utility facilities. In addition, the CPUC informed PG&E that it could seek  
21 recovery of incremental costs associated with these remedial measures outside of the standard funding  
22 process, agreeing to provide additional funding on top of vegetation management funding already  
23 authorized in order to make sure remedial measures would not go unperformed due to lack of funding.

24 60. PG&E has a duty to manage, maintain, repair, and/or replace its aging infrastructure to  
25 protect public safety. These objectives could and should have been accomplished in a number of ways,  
26 including, by not limited to, putting electrical equipment in wildfire-prone areas underground,  
27 increasing inspections, developing and implementing protocols to shut down electrical operations in  
28

1 emergency situations, modernizing infrastructure, and/or obtaining an independent audit of its risk  
2 management programs to ensure effectiveness.

3 61. PG&E knew or should have known that a breach of those standards and duties  
4 constituted negligence and would expose members of the general public to risk of death, injury, and  
5 damage to their property.

6 **B. PG&E'S INEXCUSABLE HISTORY OF SAFETY FAILURES**

7 62. PG&E's safety record is an abomination. PG&E has developed a regular pattern of  
8 placing its own profits before the safety of the California residents it serves and shows no intention of  
9 changing this pattern.

10 63. The Camp Fire was not an isolated incident. PG&E has a long history of safety lapses  
11 that caused injury and death to California residents, and destroyed or damaged their property:

12 a. **1981 San Francisco Gas Explosion:** A PG&E gas main in downtown San Francisco  
13 exploded, forcing 30,000 people to evacuate. It took workers nine hours to shut off the  
14 gas main's manual shut off valves and stop the flow of gas that continued to feed the  
15 flames in the interim.

16 b. **1992 Santa Rosa Gas Explosion:** Two people were killed and three others were  
17 injured when a PG&E gas line exploded in Santa Rosa. The pipeline was improperly  
18 marked, failing to give proper notice to contractors working in the area. A contractor  
19 hit the pipe with a backhoe, causing the pipe to leak several months later.

20 c. **1994 Trauner Fire:** The Trauner Fire burned down a historic schoolhouse and 12  
21 homes near the scenic Gold Rush town of Rough and Ready. Investigators determined  
22 that the Trauner Fire began when a 21,000-volt power line brushed against a tree limb  
23 that PG&E had failed to keep trimmed. Through random spot inspections, the  
24 investigators found hundreds of safety violations in the area near the Trauner Fire,  
25 approximately 200 of which involved contact between vegetation and PG&E's power  
26 lines. In June 1997, a Nevada County jury found PG&E guilty of 739 counts of  
27 criminal negligence and it was required to pay \$24 million in penalties. After the trial,  
28 a 1998 CPUC report revealed that PG&E diverted \$77.6 million from its tree-trimming

1 budget to other uses from 1987 to 1994. During that same time, PG&E underspent its  
2 authorized budgets for maintaining its systems by \$495 million and, instead, used this  
3 money to boost corporate profits.

4 d. **1996 Mission Substation Electrical Fire:** At approximately 1:00 AM on November  
5 27, 1996, a cable splice at PG&E's Mission Substation in San Francisco short-circuited,  
6 burning and melting the insulation around the splice. Smoke from the fire rose through  
7 a floor opening above the splice into a switch cabinet. That smoke was so thick that it  
8 caused a flashover between phases of the bus bars connecting the overhead N bus to  
9 the switch. This caused insulation on the N bus to ignite and a circuit breaker to open,  
10 resulting in the loss of power to a group of PG&E customers. The substation was  
11 unmanned at the time and the fire was only discovered by chance by an employee who  
12 had stopped by the substation to use the restroom.

13 e. **1999 Pendola Fire:** A rotten pine, which the government said PG&E should have  
14 removed, fell on a power line, starting the Pendola Fire. It burned for 11 days and  
15 scorched 11,725 acres, mainly in the Tahoe and Plumas national forests. PG&E paid a  
16 \$14.75 million settlement to the U.S. Forest Service in 2009. That year, the utility also  
17 reached a \$22.7 million settlement with the CPUC after regulators found PG&E had  
18 not spent money earmarked for tree trimming and removal toward those purposes.

19 f. **2003 Mission Substation Electrical Fire:** One third of San Francisco lost power  
20 following a 2003 fire at PG&E's Mission District Substation. The fire burned for  
21 nearly two hours before PG&E workers arrived on the scene to discover the damage.  
22 The CPUC report of the investigation, described PG&E's careless approach to safety  
23 and apparent inability to learn from its past mistakes, stating "PG&E did not implement  
24 its own recommendations from its own investigation of the 1996 fire."<sup>10</sup>

25 g. **2004 Sims Fire:** In July 2004, the Sims Fire burned over 4,000 acres of forest land in  
26 the Six Rivers National Forest and the Trinity National Forest. A federal lawsuit  
27

28 <sup>10</sup> <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedDocs/published/Report/40886.pdf>



1 alleged that PG&E failed to remove a decaying tree, which fell on a transmission line  
2 and ignited the blaze.

3 h. **2004 Fred's Fire:** The Fred's Fire started Oct. 13, 2004, near Kyburz in El Dorado  
4 County. A lawsuit filed by the U.S Government claimed that employees of PG&E's  
5 contractor lost control of a large tree they were cutting down. It fell onto a PG&E  
6 powerline and caused a fire that burned over 7,500 acres. PG&E and its contractors  
7 paid \$29.5 million to settle the lawsuits over the Fred's Fire and the Sims Fire.

8 i. **2004 Power Fire:** In October 2004, the Power Fire burned approximately 17,000 acres  
9 on the Eldorado National Forest and on private timberlands. A federal lawsuit alleged  
10 that the Power Fire was ignited by a lit cigarette that was dropped by a PG&E tree  
11 trimming contractor. PG&E and its contractor paid the federal government \$45 million  
12 to settle the lawsuit.

13 j. **2005 San Francisco Electrical Explosion:** In August 2005, a PG&E electrical  
14 transformer exploded beneath the San Francisco financial district at Kearny and Post  
15 Streets, severely burning a woman who had been walking by. A lawsuit by the injured  
16 woman settled for an undisclosed sum.

17 k. **2008 Rancho Cordova Gas Explosion:** An explosion and fire caused by a natural gas  
18 leak destroyed a residence in Rancho Cordova, California, killing one person, injuring  
19 five others and causing damage to several other nearby homes. The cause of the  
20 explosion was the use of a section of unmarked and out-of-specification pipe with  
21 inadequate wall thickness that allowed gas to leak from a mechanical coupling installed  
22 approximately two years earlier. In November 2010, the CPUC filed administrative  
23 charges alleging that PG&E was at fault for the blast because PG&E should have  
24 discovered the improper repair job that caused the explosion, but failed to timely do so.  
25 As a result, the CPUC required PG&E to pay a \$38 million fine.

26 l. **2008 Whiskey Fire:** The June 2008 Whiskey Fire burned more than 5,000 acres of  
27 land in the Mendocino National Forest. The fire started when a gray pine tree that did  
28

1 not have the required clearance from a PG&E transmission line came into contact with  
2 the line. PG&E and its contractors agreed to pay \$5.5 million to settle a federal lawsuit.

3 m. **2009 San Francisco Electrical Explosion:** In June 2009, a PG&E underground vault  
4 exploded in downtown San Francisco leaving thousands without power.

5 m. **2010 San Bruno Gas Explosion:** On September 9, 2010, PG&E's disregard of public  
6 safety caused the death of eight people, injured 58 people, and destroyed an entire  
7 neighborhood in San Bruno, California when one of its gas pipelines exploded and  
8 burst into flames. After the explosion, the NTSB issued a report that blamed the  
9 disaster on PG&E's poor management of its pipeline. In April 2015, the CPUC slapped  
10 PG&E with a \$1.6 billion fine for causing the explosion and diverting maintenance  
11 funds into stockholder dividends and executive bonuses. Further, in January 2017, a  
12 federal jury found PG&E guilty of six felony charges. The judge ordered it to pay \$3  
13 million in fines for causing the explosion, and ordered PG&E to submit to  
14 court supervision of its natural gas operations. .

15 n. **2014 Carmel Gas Explosion:** In 2014, PG&E employees damaged a gas pipeline in  
16 Carmel while digging because they lacked the legally required records on the location  
17 of the pipeline. Gas escaping from the pipeline exploded and destroyed an unoccupied  
18 cottage. The CPUC fined *PG&E* \$37.3 million and PG&E paid an additional \$1.6  
19 million to settle a related lawsuit filed by the City of Carmel.

20 o. **2015 San Francisco Electrical Explosion:** In September 2015, a PG&E underground  
21 transformer exploded in Bernal Heights, injuring two people, one of them critically.

22 p. **2015 Butte Fire in Calaveras County:** On September 9, 2015, the Butte Fire ignited  
23 when a 44 foot tall, weak grey pine tree that should have been removed by PG&E struck  
24 a 12,000-volt overhead power line that was owned and operated by PG&E. The  
25 resulting fire burned for 22 days, killing two people, burning over 70,000 acres,  
26 destroying and damaging 475 residences, 343 outbuildings, and 45 other structures.  
27 The fire also left tens of thousands of dead or dying trees and the risk of water pollution  
28

1 and erosion in its wake. Thousands of people were forced to evacuate their homes, and  
2 thousands were damaged in their person and property.

- 3 o. **2017 North Bay Fires:** On or around the night of Sunday, October 8, 2017, the North  
4 Bay Fires started when power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators,  
5 reclosers, and/or other electrical equipment constructed, owned, operated, managed,  
6 and/or maintained by PG&E fell down, broke, failed, sparked, exploded, and/or came  
7 into contact with vegetation, all because of PG&E's disregard of mandated safety  
8 practices and the foreseeable risks associated with its infrastructure. The North Bay  
9 Fires claimed the lives of at least 43 people, injured many others, burned over 245,000  
10 acres, and destroyed over 14,700 homes.

11 **C. PG&E'S INEXCUSABLE BEHAVIOR CONTRIBUTED TO THE CAUSE OF**  
12 **THE CAMP FIRE**

13 **1. The 2013 Liberty Report Found that PG&E's Distribution System**  
14 **Presented "Significant Safety Issues"**

15 64. On May 6, 2013, a report was sent to the Safety and Enforcement Division of the CPUC  
16 from the Liberty Consulting Group who had been retained to conduct an independent review of capital  
17 and operations and maintenance expenditures proposed by PG&E (hereinafter the "2013 Liberty  
18 Report").<sup>11</sup> The 2013 Liberty Report concluded that: "several aspects of the PG&E distribution system  
19 present significant safety issues." It also found: (a) "addressing risks associated with electrical  
20 distribution components has been overshadowed by electric transmission and gas facilities;" (b)  
21 "addressing aging infrastructure and adding SCADA to the system comprise the major focuses of  
22 safety initiatives for the distribution system;" and (c) "current employee/contractor serious injury and  
23 fatality levels require significantly greater mitigation."

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28 <sup>11</sup> <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/efile/g000/m065/k394/65394210.pdf>

1                   **2.       PG&E’s Failure to Treat the Conditions of Its Aging Electrical Assets as**  
2                   **an Enterprise-Level Risk**

3           65.     Another recommendation of the 2013 Liberty Report was “the establishment of a  
4 formal asset management program in Electric Operations.” According to the report, “aging  
5 infrastructure is best addressed by having a strategic asset management program in place. These types  
6 of programs, such as the PAS 55 program, force a detailed and thorough condition assessment survey  
7 of the major assets. These types of formal programs also take failure modes into consideration. Long  
8 term sustainable plans can then be prepared to address the asset conditions. A sustainable asset  
9 management will mitigate system safety risks from aging infrastructure, which constituted a major  
10 portion of the safety items in this GRC.”

11          66.     The 2013 Liberty Report specifically recommended that “PG&E treat aging  
12 infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk.”

13          67.     After the release of the 2013 Liberty Report, PG&E began to publicly state that they  
14 were treating wildfires as an enterprise-level risk. However, the methodology used by PG&E to  
15 evaluate the severity of that risk was and is unscientific and was and is not based on valid statistical  
16 methodology. Instead, PG&E’s method is to engage in a group discussion where an agreement is  
17 reached on a specific risk level based on personal opinion, anecdotal evidence, and factual  
18 misconceptions. This process has led to PG&E’s failure to properly evaluate the frequency and  
19 severity of the risk posed by wildfires.

20          68.     Further, PG&E has a corporate policy in which they knowingly “accept” a certain level  
21 of risk, meaning that PG&E choose not to maintain their electrical transmission and distribution  
22 infrastructure in a manner that will reasonably prevent all risks of which they are aware, thereby  
23 leaving the public at risk of death, personal injury, and damage to property.

24          69.     PG&E’s failure to treat its aging infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk in a  
25 reasonable manner contributed to the cause of the Camp Fire.

26                   **3.       PG&E’s Failure to Inspect, Maintain, Repair, or Replace Its Equipment**

27          70.     PG&E failed to perform the necessary inspections, maintenance, repair, and/or  
28 replacement of its electrical equipment.

1           71. For example, a 2014 audit of PG&E's North Valley Division revealed that between  
2 2009 and 2014 there were over 3,400 PG&E repair and maintenance requests in the area of the Camp  
3 Fire that were completed past the date of scheduled action.<sup>12</sup> This number shows a staggering  
4 disregard of the safety to the people who eventually found themselves in the path of the Camp Fire.

5           72. According to State Senator Jerry Hill, these findings are especially troubling because  
6 "they are getting the money for these, they are getting the funds to do the work in a timely manner."<sup>13</sup>  
7 Yet, PG&E takes the money but fails to correct the problems.

8           73. Further, according to records maintained by Cal Fire, forty-four (44) fires in Butte  
9 County were caused by electrical equipment from 2008 through 2016.<sup>14</sup> In 2015, electrical power  
10 problems sparked the burning of 149,241 acres across California – more than twice the amount from  
11 any other cause.<sup>15</sup>

12           74. According to the 2017 CPUC "Order Instituting Investigation into the Creation of a  
13 Shared Database or Statewide Census of Utility Poles and Conduit":

14           "Poorly maintained poles and attachments have caused substantial property damage  
15 and repeated loss of life in this State. For example, inadequate clearance between  
16 communication and power lines, perhaps in conjunction with a broken cable lashing  
17 wire, caused the Southern California Guejito Fire of 2007 which (together with the  
18 Witch Fire) burned 197,990 acres and caused two deaths. Three more deaths occurred  
19 in 2011 when an electrical conductor separated from a pole in high winds, causing a  
20 live wire to fall to the ground. At least five more people lost their lives in pole-related  
21 failures in 2012 and 2015.

22           "Unauthorized pole attachments are particularly problematic. A pole overloaded with  
23 unauthorized equipment collapsed during windy conditions and started the Malibu  
24 Canyon Fire of 2007, destroying and damaging luxury homes and burning over 4500  
25 acres. Windstorms in 2011 knocked down a large number of poles in Southern  
26 California, many of which were later found to be weakened by termites, dry rot, and  
27 fungal decay.

28           "Communication and other wires are not infrequently found hanging onto roads or  
yards. Poles with excessive and/or unauthorized attachments can put utility workers at  
risk. Facilities deployed in the field may differ from what appears on paper or in a  
utility's database."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC\\_Public\\_Website/Content/Safety/EA2014-023.pdf](http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/EA2014-023.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/State-Audit-Shows-PGE-Had-Repair-Job-Backlog-in-Sonoma-Santa-Rosa-451996923.html>

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire\\_protection/fire\\_protection\\_fire\\_info\\_redbooks](http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/fire_protection_fire_info_redbooks)

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-utility-wildfires-20171017-story.html>

<sup>16</sup> <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M190/K872/190872933.pdf>



1 75. PG&E's failure to conduct proper and regular inspections of its equipment and failure  
2 to make necessary repairs contributed to the cause of the Camp Fire.

3 **4. PG&E's "Run to Failure" Approach to Maintenance**

4 76. PG&E's failure to address the "significant safety hazards" identified by the 2013  
5 Liberty Report, failure to treat the conditions of its aging infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk,  
6 failure to inspect, maintain, repair or replace its aging equipment, failure to conduct an inventory of  
7 its electrical assets, and failure to ensure its infrastructure could withstand foreseeable weather  
8 conditions as required by law are all indicative of what has been called PG&E's "run to failure"  
9 approach to its infrastructure.

10 77. PG&E has a well-documented history of implementing this "run to failure" approach  
11 with its aging infrastructure, ignoring necessary maintenance in order to line its own pockets with  
12 excessive profits. According to a filing by Office of Ratepayer Advocates with the CPUC in May  
13 2013:

14 "However, as we saw in Section V.F.3 above, the Overland Audit explains how PG&E  
15 systematically underfunded GT&S integrity management and maintenance operations  
16 for the years 2008 through 2010. PG&E engaged in a 'run to failure' strategy whereby  
17 it deferred needed maintenance projects and changed the assessment method for several  
18 pipelines from ILI to the less informative ECDA approach – all to increase its profits  
19 even further beyond its already generous authorized rate of return, which averaged  
20 11.2% between 1996 and 2010.

21 "Given PG&E's excessive profits over the period of the Overland Audit, there is no  
22 reason to believe that Overland's example regarding GT&S operations between 2008  
23 and 2010 was unique. The IRP Report supplements the Overland Audit findings with  
24 additional examples of PG&E management's commitment to profits over safety. Thus,  
25 it is evident that while the example of GT&S underfunding between 2008 and 2010  
26 might be extreme, it was not an isolated incident; rather, it represents the culmination  
27 of PG&E management's long standing policy to squeeze every nickel it could from  
28 PG&E gas operations and maintenance, regardless of the long term 'run to failure'  
impacts. And PG&E has offered no evidence to the contrary."<sup>17</sup>

78. PG&E's failure to address this "run to failure" approach to maintenance contributed to  
the cause of the Camp Fire.

<sup>17</sup>[http://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20150130ResponseToA1312012Ruling/2013/03/SB\\_GT&S\\_0039691.pdf](http://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20150130ResponseToA1312012Ruling/2013/03/SB_GT&S_0039691.pdf)

1                   **5.       PG&E's Purchase of Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages**

2           79.     Under Insurance Code § 533 provides in pertinent part: “An insurer is not liable for a  
3 loss caused by the willful act of the insured . . . .”

4           80.     Civil Code § 1668 provides: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or  
5 indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or  
6 property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

7           81.     Despite the statutory exoneration given to insurance companies for liability for losses  
8 caused by willful acts of an insured, and despite the fact that the public policy of the State of California  
9 invalidates any insurance contract that purports to provide coverage for punitive damages, PG&E has  
10 purchased policies of insurance from offshore companies in Bermuda, London, and elsewhere that  
11 expressly provide coverage for punitive damages in amounts that exceed hundreds of millions of  
12 dollars.

13          82.     PG&E purchased insurance policies that cover punitive damages for the purpose of  
14 providing corporate security at the cost of public safety. This contributed to a culture of reckless  
15 disregard for the safety of the residents of Northern and Central California and contributed to the cause  
16 of the Camp Fire.

17           **D.       PG&E'S CORPORATE CULTURE IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CAMP**  
18           **FIRE**

19          83.     PG&E is a virtual monopoly in the provision of gas and electric services to the general  
20 public in almost all counties and cities across Northern and Central California.<sup>18</sup>

21          84.     Over the past thirty-plus years, PG&E has been subject to numerous fines, penalties,  
22 and/or convictions as a result of its failure to abide by safety rules and regulations, including the fines,  
23 penalties, settlements, and convictions detailed above. Despite these recurring punishments, PG&E  
24 continues to display a shocking degree of arrogant complacency, refuses to modify its behavior, and  
25 continues to conduct its business with a conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including  
26 Plaintiffs.

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28                   

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<sup>18</sup> A few cities like Palo Alto and Sacramento provide their own gas and electric utility services.

1           85.     Rather than spend the money it obtains from customers for infrastructure maintenance  
2 and safety, PG&E funnels this funding to boost its own corporate profits and compensation. This  
3 pattern and practice of favoring profits over having a solid and well-maintained infrastructure that  
4 would be safe and dependable for years to come left PG&E vulnerable to an increased risk of a  
5 catastrophic event such as the Camp Fire.

6           86.     For example, according to documents released by The Utility Reform Network  
7 (“TURN”), PG&E planned to replace a segment of the San Bruno pipeline in 2007 that it identified as  
8 one of the riskiest pipelines in PG&E’s system. PG&E collected \$5 million from its customers to  
9 complete the project by 2009, but instead deferred the project until it was too late and repurposed the  
10 money to other priorities. That same year, PG&E spent nearly \$5 million on bonuses for six of its top  
11 executives.

12           87.     Moreover, PG&E has implemented multiple programs that provide monetary  
13 incentives to its employees, agents, and/or contractors to not protect public safety. Prior to the Butte  
14 Fire, PG&E chose to provide a monetary incentive to its contractors to cut fewer trees, even though  
15 PG&E was required to have an inspection program in place that removed dangerous trees and reduced  
16 the risk of wildfires. Robert Urban, a regional officer for a PG&E contractor, stated that he had a  
17 concern that the bonus system incentivized his employees to not do their job, but PG&E chose to keep  
18 this program despite knowing this risk. Similarly, prior to the San Bruno explosion, PG&E had a  
19 program that provided financial incentives to employees to not report or fix gas leaks and keep repair  
20 costs down. This program resulted in the failure to detect a significant number of gas leaks, many of  
21 which were considered serious leaks. According to Richard Kuprewicz, an independent pipeline  
22 safety expert, PG&E’s incentive system was “training and rewarding people to do the wrong thing,”  
23 emblematic of “a seriously broken process,” and “explains many of the systemic problems in this  
24 operation that contributed to the [San Bruno] tragedy.”<sup>19</sup>

25           88.     As detailed above, the Camp Fire just one example of the many tragedies that have  
26 resulted from PG&E’s enduring failure to protect the public from the dangers associated with its

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>19</sup><https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/PG-E-incentive-system-blamed-for-leak-oversights-2424430.php>

1 operations. PG&E power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, and/or other electrical  
2 equipment have repeatedly started wildfires due to PG&E's ongoing failure to create, manage,  
3 implement, and/or maintain effective vegetation management programs for the areas near and around  
4 its electrical equipment. Further, PG&E's aging infrastructure has caused multiple disasters  
5 throughout California.

6 89. As detailed more fully above, PG&E repeatedly fails to inspect, maintain, repair, or  
7 replace its equipment. These failures also contributed to both the Butte and North Bay Fires, yet  
8 PG&E continues to deny liability for those fires and even claims that it did nothing wrong.

9 90. PG&E owes the public a non-delegable duty with regard to the operation of its power  
10 lines, including as it relates to maintenance, inspection, repair and all other obligations imposed by the  
11 Public Utilities Code and the CPUC, specifically including, but not limited to, General Orders  
12 Numbers 95 and 165. Even when PG&E chooses to hire contractors, its obligations remain non-  
13 delegable. PG&E's acts and omissions, as described herein, were a cause of the Camp Fire and/or  
14 aggravated the spread and destruction of the Camp Fire.

15 91. On the days leading up to the Camp Fire, PG&E began notifying 70,000 customers of  
16 the "potential that the company would turn off power for safety reasons *given forecasts of extreme*  
17 *fire danger conditions.*" Despite its own recognition of these impending hazardous conditions, on the  
18 day of the Camp Fire's ignition, PG&E ultimately made the decision not to proceed with its plans for  
19 a power shutoff.<sup>20</sup> It was not until November 9, 2018, after the Camp Fire already incinerated the  
20 towns of Concow, Magalia, and Paradise, that PG&E turned off power to some of its customers.<sup>21</sup>

21 92. At all times relevant to this action PG&E had specific knowledge that wildfire is the  
22 greatest risk to the public from its operations. PG&E specifically knew that wildfire could result in  
23 death and injury to members of the public and could result in the destruction of structures and property.

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26 <sup>20</sup>[https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181108\\_pge\\_determines  
27 to\\_not\\_proceed\\_with\\_public\\_safety\\_power\\_shutoff\\_planned\\_for\\_portions\\_of\\_eight\\_northern\\_calif  
28 ornia\\_counties](https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181108_pge_determines_to_not_proceed_with_public_safety_power_shutoff_planned_for_portions_of_eight_northern_california_counties)

<sup>21</sup>[https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181109\\_pge\\_mobilizes  
response\\_to\\_camp\\_fire\\_impacts\\_in\\_butte\\_and\\_plumas\\_counties](https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181109_pge_mobilizes_response_to_camp_fire_impacts_in_butte_and_plumas_counties)

1           93. PG&E chose to accept and continue implementing its current practices that have  
2 resulted in significant safety issues in its transmission system, a failure to treat the conditions of its  
3 aging electrical assets, and a failure to inspect, maintain, repair and replace. PG&E's choice resulted  
4 numerous deaths, injuries, and damage to structures and property, just as PG&E knew it could, when  
5 PG&E made the choice to put profits over safety.

6           94. PG&E needs to put safety over profits, regardless of cost.

7 **V. CAUSES OF ACTION**

8 **A. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION AGAINST**  
9 **PG&E**

10           95. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
11 forth herein.

12           96. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for Inverse Condemnation against PG&E.

13           97. On November 8, 2018, Plaintiffs were owners of real property and/or personal property  
14 located within Butte County in the area of the Camp Fire.

15           98. Prior to and on November 8, 2018, Defendants, and/or each of them, installed, owned,  
16 operated, used, controlled, and/or maintained power lines and other electrical equipment for the public  
17 delivery of electricity, including power lines in and around the location of the Camp Fire.

18           99. On November 8, 2018, as a direct, necessary, and legal result of Defendants'  
19 installation, ownership, operation, use, control, management, and/or maintenance for a public use of  
20 its power lines and/or other electrical equipment, the power lines and/or other electrical equipment  
21 came in contact with vegetation and/or other live conductors, and/or broke, failed, fell down, sparked,  
22 and/or exploded, causing the Camp Fire that killed at least 88 people and burned at least 153,000  
23 acres, including property owned and/or occupied by Plaintiffs.

24           100. The above described damage to Plaintiffs' property was legally and substantially  
25 caused by Defendants' actions in their installation, ownership, operation, use, control, management,  
26 and/or maintenance of the power lines and other electrical equipment for a public use.

1           101. Plaintiffs have not received adequate compensation for the damage to and/or  
2 destruction of their property, thus constituting a taking or damaging of Plaintiffs' property by  
3 Defendants without just compensation.

4           102. As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or omissions of the Defendants, Plaintiffs  
5 suffered damages to their real and/or personal property, including the loss of use, interference with  
6 access, and/or diminution in value and/or marketability in an amount according to proof at trial.

7           103. As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or omissions of the Defendants, Plaintiffs  
8 have incurred and will continue to incur costs, disbursements, and/or expenses, including reasonable  
9 attorney, appraisal, engineering and/or other expert fees due to the conduct of the Defendants in  
10 amounts that cannot yet be ascertained, but which are recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure  
11 § 1036.

12           **B. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST ALL**  
13           **DEFENDANTS**

14           104. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
15 forth herein.

16           105. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for negligence against all Defendants.

17           106. The Camp Fire was a direct and legal result of the negligence, carelessness,  
18 recklessness, and/or unlawfulness of Defendants, and/or each of them. Defendants, and/or each of  
19 them, breached their respective duties owed individually and/or collectively to Plaintiffs by, including  
20 but not limited to: (1) failing to comply with the applicable statutory, regulatory, and/or professional  
21 standards of care; (2) failing to timely and properly maintain, manage, inspect, and/or monitor the  
22 subject power lines, electrical equipment, and/or adjacent vegetation; (3) failing to make the overhead  
23 lines safe under all the exigencies created by surrounding circumstances and conditions; (4) failing to  
24 conduct adequate, reasonably prompt, proper, effective, and/or frequent inspections of the electrical  
25 transmission lines, wires, and/or associated equipment; (5) failing to design, construct, monitor, and/or  
26 maintain high voltage electrical transmission, and/or distribution power lines in a manner that avoids  
27 the potential to ignite a fire during long, dry seasons; (6) failing to install the equipment necessary  
28 and/or to inspect and repair the equipment installed, to prevent electrical transmission and distribution



1 lines from improperly sagging, operating, and/or making contact with other metal wires placed on its  
2 poles and igniting fires; (7) failing to keep equipment in a safe condition and/or manage equipment to  
3 prevent fire at all times; (8) failing to de-energize power lines during fire prone conditions; (9) failing  
4 to de-energize power lines after the fire's ignition; and/or (10) failing to properly train and to supervise  
5 employees and agents responsible for maintenance and inspection of the transmission lines and/or  
6 vegetation areas nearby these lines.

7 107. As a direct and legal result of Defendants' actions and/or omissions, Plaintiffs were  
8 injured in their health, strength, and/or activity in an amount according to proof at trial.

9 108. As a further direct and legal result of Defendants' actions and/or omissions, Plaintiffs  
10 were required to and/or continue to employ physicians and other healthcare providers to examine,  
11 treat, and/or care for their injuries. Plaintiffs have incurred, and will continue to incur, medical and  
12 incidental expenses in an amount according to proof at trial.

13 109. As a further direct and legal result of Defendants' actions and/or omissions, Plaintiffs  
14 have suffered and/or continue to suffer great mental pain and suffering, including worry, emotional  
15 distress, humiliation, embarrassment, anguish, anxiety, and nervousness. Plaintiffs are informed and  
16 believe, and upon such information and belief allege, that such injuries have resulted in debilitating  
17 injuries in an amount according to proof at trial.

18 110. As a further direct and legal result of the Defendants' actions and/or omissions,  
19 Plaintiffs have suffered a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, loss of profits, increased expenses  
20 due to displacement, and/or other consequential economic losses in an amount according to proof at  
21 trial.

22 111. As a further direct and legal result of the Defendants' actions and/or omissions,  
23 Plaintiffs have suffered damage to real property, including the loss of vegetation, trees, and structures,  
24 the creation of hydrophobic soil conditions, and a loss of use, benefit, goodwill, diminution in value,  
25 and/or enjoyment of such property in an amount according to proof at trial.

26 112. As a further direct and legal result of the Defendants' actions and/or omissions,  
27 Plaintiffs have suffered damage to and/or a loss of personal property, including but not limited to items  
28 of peculiar value to Plaintiffs in an amount according to proof at trial.

1           113. As a further direct and legal result of the Defendants' actions and/or omissions s,  
2 Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur expenses and other economic damages related to  
3 the damage to their property, including costs relating to storage, clean-up, disposal, repair,  
4 depreciation, and/or replacement of their property, and/or other related consequential damages in an  
5 amount according to proof at trial.

6           114. As detailed in above, Defendants' safety record is inexcusably horrendous. Defendants  
7 have had several other incidents that caused injury and death to California residents, and destroyed  
8 properties, and has been subject to numerous penalties, including, but not limited to record fines  
9 following the San Bruno Explosion, as a result of their failure to comply with safety standards, rules  
10 and regulations. Despite these fines and punishments, Defendants failed to modify their behavior,  
11 continuing their practice of placing their own profits over safety and conducting their business with a  
12 conscious disregard for the safety and well-being of the public and property.

13           115. The Camp Fire was the result of Defendants' continued practice of prioritizing profits  
14 over safety, wherein they failed to properly maintain and inspect their power lines knowing that the  
15 likely result was a fire that would pose risk of serious injury and/or death, and damage to property.

16           116. At all times prior to the subject incident, the conduct of Defendants, by act and/or  
17 omission, demonstrated a wanton and/or reckless indifference for the required maintenance of  
18 Defendants' electrical infrastructure, as well as a conscious disregard for and a foreseeable risk of  
19 serious injury and death of others. The wrongful conduct of Defendants was more than just  
20 inadvertence, error of judgment or negligence. Rather, Defendants conduct was despicable and  
21 showed malice as defined by Civil Code § 3294. The state has an extremely strong interest in imposing  
22 sufficiently high punitive damages in actions where the malicious conduct of Defendants leads to the  
23 wrongful death of one of its citizens. As a result, Plaintiffs request that the trier of fact, in the exercise  
24 of sound discretion of the rights and safety of others, such that additional damages for the sake of  
25 example and sufficient to punish said Defendants for their despicable conduct, in an amount  
26 reasonably related to Plaintiffs' actual damages and Defendants' wealth, yet sufficiently large enough  
27 to be an example to others and to deter Defendants and others from engaging in similar conduct in the  
28 future.

1 117. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek  
2 exemplary damages for injuries to Plaintiffs' animals as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure §  
3 3340.

4 **C. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR**  
5 **DAMAGES PURSUANT TO PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE § 2106**

6 118. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
7 forth herein.

8 119. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for violations of the Constitution, the laws of  
9 California, and/or orders and decisions of the California Public Utilities Commission against all  
10 Defendants.

11 120. This private right of action is authorized by Public Utilities Code § 2106, which permits  
12 action by a person or entity who have suffered loss, damages, or injury caused by the acts of a public  
13 utility which does, causes to be done, or permits any act, matter, or thing prohibited or declared  
14 unlawful, or which omits to do any act, matter, or thing required to be done, either by the Constitution,  
15 any law of this State, or any order or decision of the commission.

16 121. Defendants at all times herein had a duty to properly design, construct, operate,  
17 maintain, inspect, and manage its electrical infrastructure in compliance with all relevant provisions  
18 of applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes, including, but not limited to, those stated  
19 in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.2; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil Procedure  
20 § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities Code § 451.

21 122. The violation of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which defines a  
22 minimum standard of conduct is unreasonable per se.

23 123. Defendants violated the above listed requirements, by:

- 24 a. Failing to service, inspect or maintain electrical infrastructure, structures and  
25 vegetation affixed to and in close proximity to high voltage electrical lines;  
26 b. Failing to provide electrical supply systems of suitable design;  
27 c. Failing to construct and to maintain such systems for their intended use of safe  
28 transmission of electricity considering the known condition of the combination of the

dry season and vegetation of the area, resulting in Plaintiff(s) being susceptible to the ignition and spread of fire and the fire hazard and danger of electricity and electrical transmission and distribution;

d. Failing to properly design, construct, operate, maintain, inspect and manage its electrical supply systems and the surrounding arid vegetation resulting in said vegetation igniting and accelerating the spread of the fire;

e. Failing to properly safeguard against the ignition of fire during the course and scope of employee work on behalf of DEFENDANTS; and

f. Failing to comply with the enumerated legislative enactments and administrative regulations.

124. Defendants proximately and substantially caused the destruction, damage, and injury to Plaintiffs by their violations of applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.2, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.3, and 48-48.7; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities Code § 451.

125. Plaintiffs were and are within the class of persons for whose protection applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes were adopted, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.2, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.3, and 48-48.7; (b) General Order No. 165(c) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities Code § 451.

126. As alleged herein according to proof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for all loss, damages and injury caused by and resulting from Defendants' violation of applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes were adopted, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.2, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.3, and 48-48.7; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities Code § 451.

1           127. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants,  
2 and/or each of them, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of exemplary damages against Defendants as set forth  
3 above pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 2106.

4           **D.     FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PREMISES LIABILITY AGAINST ALL**  
5           **DEFENDANTS**

6           128. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
7 forth herein.

8           129. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for Premises Liability against all Defendants.

9           130. Defendants, and/or each of them, were the owners of an easement and/or real property  
10 in the area of origin of the Camp Fire, and/or were the owners of the power lines upon said easement  
11 and/or right of way.

12          131. Defendants, and/or each of them, acted wantonly, unlawfully, carelessly, recklessly,  
13 and/or negligently in failing to properly inspect, manage, maintain, and/or control the vegetation near  
14 its power lines along the real property and easement, allowing an unsafe condition presenting a  
15 foreseeable risk of fire danger to exist on said property.

16          132. As a direct, proximate and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of  
17 Defendants, and/or each of them, Plaintiffs suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries and damages  
18 as set forth above.

19          133. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants,  
20 and/or each of them, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against  
21 Defendants as set forth above.

22           **E.     FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRESPASS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS**

23          134. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
24 forth herein.

25          135. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for Trespass against all Defendants.

26          136. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs were the owners, tenants, and/or lawful  
27 occupants of property damaged by the Camp Fire.

1           137. Defendants, and/or each of them, in wrongfully acting and/or failing to act in the  
2 manner set forth above, caused the Camp Fire to ignite and/or spread out of control, causing harm,  
3 damage, and/or injury to Plaintiffs herein, resulting in a trespass upon Plaintiffs' property interests.

4           138. Plaintiffs did not grant permission for Defendants to wrongfully act in manner so as to  
5 cause the Camp Fire, and thereby produce a wildland fire which spread and wrongfully entered upon  
6 their property, resulting in the harm, injury, and/or damage alleged above.

7           139. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and/or each of them,  
8 which led to the trespass, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer damages as set forth  
9 above, in an amount according to proof at trial.

10           140. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs,  
11 whose land was under cultivation, and/or was used for raising livestock or was intended to be used for  
12 raising livestock, have hired and retained counsel to recover compensation for loss and damage and  
13 are entitled to recover all attorney's fees, expert fees, consultant fees, and litigation costs and expenses,  
14 as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9.

15           141. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek treble  
16 damages for injuries to trees or timber on Plaintiffs' property as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure  
17 § 733.

18           142. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek double  
19 and/or treble damages for the negligent, willful, and wrongful injuries to timber, trees, or underwood  
20 on their property, as allowed under Civil Code § 3346.

21           143. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants, and/or  
22 each of them, Plaintiffs suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries and damages as set forth above.

23           144. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants,  
24 and/or each of them, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against  
25 Defendants as set forth above.

1           **F.     SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE AGAINST ALL**  
2           **DEFENDANTS**

3           145.   Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
4 forth herein.

5           146.   Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for Public Nuisance against all Defendants.

6           147.   Plaintiffs own and/or occupy property at or near the site of the fire that is the subject of  
7 this action. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs had a right to occupy, enjoy, and/or use their  
8 property without interference by Defendants, and/or each of them.

9           148.   Defendants, and/or each of them, owed a duty to the public, including Plaintiffs herein,  
10 to conduct their business, in particular the maintenance and/or operation of power lines, power poles,  
11 and/or electrical equipment on power poles, and adjacent vegetation in proximity to their power lines  
12 in Butte County in a manner that did not threaten harm or injury to the public welfare from operation  
13 of those power lines.

14          149.   Defendants and/or each of them, by acting and/or failing to act, as alleged hereinabove,  
15 created a condition that was harmful to the health of the public, including these Plaintiffs and that  
16 interfered with the comfortable occupancy, use, and/or enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property.

17          150.   Plaintiffs did not consent, expressly or impliedly, to the wrongful conduct of  
18 Defendants, and/or each of them, in acting in the manner set forth above.

19          151.   The hazardous condition which was created by and/or permitted to exist by Defendants,  
20 and/or each of them, affected a substantial number of people within the general public, including  
21 Plaintiffs herein, and constituted a public nuisance under Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480 and Public  
22 Resources Code § 4171. Further, the ensuing uncontrolled wildfire constituted a public nuisance under  
23 Public Resources Code § 4170.

24          152.   The damaging effects of Defendants' maintenance of a fire hazard and the ensuing  
25 uncontrolled wildfire are ongoing and affect the public at large. As a result of the fire's location,  
26 temperature, and/or duration, extensive areas of hydrophobic soils developed within the fire's  
27 perimeter. This further caused significant post fire runoff hazards to occur, including hillside erosion,  
28



1 debris flow hazards, and sediment laden flow hazards. As a result, large quantities of ash and sediment  
2 will be deposited in perennial and ephemeral watercourses.

3 153. As a direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants, and/or each of them, Plaintiffs  
4 suffered harm that is different from the type of harm suffered by the general public. Specifically,  
5 Plaintiffs have lost the occupancy, possession, use, and/or enjoyment of their land, real and/or personal  
6 property, including, but not limited to: a reasonable and rational fear that the area is still dangerous; a  
7 diminution in the fair market value of their property; an impairment of the salability of their property;  
8 soils that have become hydrophobic; exposure to an array of toxic substances on their land; the  
9 presence of “special waste” on their property that requires special management and disposal; and a  
10 lingering smell of smoke, and/or constant soot, ash, and/or dust in the air.

11 154. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants, and/or each of them,  
12 Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, discomfort, anxiety, fear, worries, annoyance,  
13 and/or stress attendant to the interference with Plaintiffs’ occupancy, possession, use and/or enjoyment  
14 of their property, as alleged above. A reasonable, ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or  
15 disturbed by the condition created by Defendants, and/or each of them, and the resulting fire. The  
16 conduct of Defendants and/or each of them, is unreasonable and the seriousness of the harm to the  
17 public, including Plaintiffs herein, outweighs the social utility of Defendants’ conduct.

18 155. The individual and/or collective conduct of Defendants set forth above, and/or each of  
19 them, resulting in the Camp Fire is not an isolated incident, but is ongoing and/or a repeated course of  
20 conduct, and Defendants’ prior conduct and/or failures have resulted in other fires and damage to the  
21 public.

22 156. The unreasonable conduct of Defendants, and/or each of them, is a direct and legal  
23 cause of the harm, injury, and/or damage to the public, including Plaintiffs herein.

24 157. Defendants, and/or each of them, have individually and/or collectively, failed and  
25 refused to conduct proper inspections and to properly trim, prune, and/or cut vegetation in order to  
26 ensure the sole delivery of electricity to residents through the operation of power lines in the affected  
27 area, and Defendants’ individual and/or collective failure to do so exposed every member of the public,  
28

1 including those residing and/or owning property in Butte County, to a foreseeable danger of personal  
2 injury, death, and/or a loss of or destruction real and personal property.

3 158. The conduct of Defendants, and/or each of them, set forth above constitutes a public  
4 nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480, Public Resources Code §§4104 and  
5 4170, and Code of Civil Procedure § 731. Under Civil Code § 3493, Plaintiffs have standing to  
6 maintain an action for public nuisance because the nuisance is especially injurious to Plaintiffs  
7 because, as more specifically described above, it is injurious and/or offensive to the senses of the  
8 Plaintiffs, unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of their properties, and/or  
9 unlawfully obstructs the free use, in the customary manner, of Plaintiffs' properties, and have suffered  
10 harm, injury, and damages.

11 159. For these reasons, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction ordering that Defendants, and  
12 each of them, stop continued violation of: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2,  
13 44.1-44.3, and 48-48.7; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and  
14 4435; and (d) Public Utilities Code § 451. Plaintiffs also seek an order directing Defendants to abate  
15 the existing and continuing nuisance described above.

16 **G. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE AGAINST ALL**  
17 **DEFENDANTS**

18 160. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
19 forth herein.

20 161. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for Private Nuisance against all Defendants.

21 162. Defendants, and/or each of them, by their acts and/or omissions set forth above, directly  
22 and legally caused an obstruction to the free use of Plaintiffs' property, an invasion the Plaintiffs' right  
23 to use their property, and/or an interference with the enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property, resulting in  
24 Plaintiffs' suffering unreasonable harm and substantial actual damages constituting a nuisance  
25 pursuant to Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3481.

26 163. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants, and/or  
27 each of them, Plaintiffs suffered, and continue to suffer loss and damage to property, discomfort,  
28 annoyance and emotional distress, and the injuries and damages as set forth above.

1           164. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants,  
2 and/or each of them, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against  
3 Defendants as set forth above.

4           **H. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH & SAFETY**  
5           **CODE § 13007 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS**

6           165. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each of the paragraphs above as though fully set  
7 forth herein.

8           166. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for violations of Health & Safety Code § 13007  
9 against all Defendants.

10          167. Defendants, and/or each of them, by their acts and/or omissions described above, set  
11 fire to and/or allowed fire to be set to the property of another in violation of Health & Safety Code §  
12 13007.

13          168. As a direct and legal result of Defendants' violation of Health & Safety Code § 13007,  
14 Plaintiffs suffered property damages that are recoverable from Defendants under Health & Safety  
15 Code § 13007.21, and continue to suffer the injuries and damages described above.

16          169. As a further direct and legal result of Defendants' violations of Health & Safety Code  
17 § 13007, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9.

18          170. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants,  
19 and/or each of them, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against  
20 Defendants as set forth above.

21 **VI. PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A JURY TRIAL**

22          171. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial.

23 **VII. PRAYER**

24          WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as  
25 follows:

26          **For the Cause of Action for Inverse Condemnation:**

- 27          a. Repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of damaged, destroyed, and/or lost personal  
28             and/or real property;

- b. Loss of the use, benefit, goodwill, and enjoyment of the Plaintiffs' real and/or personal property;
- c. Loss of wages, earning capacity and/or business profits and/or any related displacement expenses;
- d. All costs of suit including attorney's fees, expert fees, and related costs;
- e. Any and all relief, compensation, or measure of damages available to Plaintiffs by law based on the injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiffs;
- f. For prejudgment interest;
- g. For all costs of suit incurred herein; and
- h. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

**For the Causes of Action for: Negligence; Private Right of Action under Public Utilities Code § 2106; Premises Liability; Trespass; Public Nuisance; Private Nuisance; and Violations of Health & Safety Code § 13007:**

- a. Repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of damaged, destroyed, and/or lost personal and/or real property;
- b. Loss of the use, benefit, goodwill, and enjoyment of the Plaintiffs' real and/or personal property;
- c. Loss of wages, earning capacity and/or business profits and/or any related displacement expenses;
- d. General damages in an amount according to proof;
- e. Special damages in an amount according to proof;
- f. Treble damages in an amount according to proof for injuries to trees as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 733;
- g. Treble or double damages in an amount according to proof for wrongful injuries to timber, trees, or underwood, as allowed under Civil Code § 3346;
- h. Exemplary damages in an amount according to proof as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 3294;

- i. Exemplary damages in an amount according to proof as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 3340;
- j. Exemplary damages in an amount according to proof as allowed under Public Utilities Code § 2106;
- k. Imposition of a permanent injunction ordering that Defendants, and each of them, stop continued violation of: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.1; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (d) Public Utilities Code § 451;
- l. Issuance of an order directing Defendants to abate the existing and continuing nuisance they caused.
- m. Attorney's fees, expert fees, consultant fees and litigation costs and expenses as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9;
- n. Prejudgment interest;
- o. All costs of suit incurred herein; and
- p. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED: December 6, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

**COREY, LUZAICH, DE GHETALDI & RIDDLE LLP**

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